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LARCENY

-

ELECTRICITY

AS

THE

OF.-[Illinois] Defendant
was indicted under the larceny
statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 38,
§387) for having diverted 70,601
kilowatt-hours of electric energy
around the meter installed by the
power company for the purpose of
registering the amount of electricity used. A motion to quash the
indictment was granted on the
ground that electricity was not the
subject of larceny. On appeal it
was held that the motion to quash
should have been denied since
electricity, although not the subject of larceny at common law, is
such under the statute. People v.
Managas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N. E. (2d)
403 (1937).
Whether, under the common law
definition of the crime, electricity
can be the subject of larcenous
asportation was first decided by
the courts of this country in an
unreported case in the Court of
First Instance for the Judicial District of Manila (United States v.
Jose de Leon, Feb. 3, 1910) in
which a statute which restated the
common law was held to comprehend electrical energy. This conclusion was also arrived at in
United States v. Carlos, 21 Philippine Rep. 553 (1911). No other
decisions on the matter have been
SUBJECT

found in either the United States
or England, principally due to the
prevalence of statutes expressly
making meter tampering a misdemeanor. E. g., Ariz. Rev. Code
Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4761;
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 38, §292;
W. Va. Code Ann. (1937) §5985;

Wis. Stat. (1937) §98.25 (2).
In the instant case the court was
confronted at the outset by a dictum in Moline Water Power Co. v.
Cox, 252 Ill. 348, 357, 96 N. E.
1044, 1047 (1911) where the court
said in reference to electrical
energy, "at common law it could
not be the subject of larceny,
which must be of goods and chattels . . ." The court there construed "goods and chattels" to include only "tangible- entities," and
held that electricity was not within that limitation, concluding that
it could not be stolen at common
law.
Rather than attack this prior
dictum the court in the instant
case saw fit to base its conclusion
upon the supposed distinction between -the scope of the larceny
statute and that of the
nrime
at
common law. It was pointed out
that the statute specified unreservedly that "personal property"
should be the subject-matter of
the crime, and cases supporting in
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other connections the proposition
that electrical energy may be personal property were cited: Ashwander v.T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288
(1935) (electrical energy susceptible of disposition as "property
belonging to the United States"
within the meaning of U. S. Const.
Art. IV, §3); Hetheringtonv.Camp
Bird Mining Co., 70 Colo. 531, 202
Pac. 1087 (1921). See also Sixtyseventh South Munn, Inc. v.Board
of Commissioners, 106 N. J. L. 45,
147 At]. 735 (1929).
Ifitbe assumed, as the court in
the instant case did, that at common law electricity was not the
subject of larceny, the court's conclusion that electricity now may
be the subject of larceny under the
Illinois statute seems a rather dubious construction. It is doubtful
whether the term "personal property" as thus used in the statute
was intended to be employed in its
broadest sense since in the same
section the legislature found it
necessary expressly to provide that
the felonious asportation of such
intangible personal property as
"any bond, bill, note, receipt' or
any instrument of writing of value
to the owner" should be larceny.
Furthermore, many of the judicial
definitions of common law larceny
use the same phrase, "personal
property." E. g., State v. Brewington, 25 Del. 71, 78 Atl. 402 (1910).
It thus appears very questionable
whether the statute was intended
to expand the scope of larceny beyond the new categories expressly
set out, "arid under the rule that
criminal statutes are to be construed in the manner most favorable to the accused it is difficult
to justify the interpretation.
Rather than to thus strain the
scope of the statute the court
might better have re-examined its

dictum in the Moline case, supra.
The court's assertion there that
larceny at common law extends
only to "tangible entities" seems
unfounded. The true distinction
between the sorts of personality
which are, and those which are not
the subject of larceny is brought
out by a quotation from 36 C. J.
§8, set out in People v. Ashworth,
222 N. Y. S. 24, 28 (1927), in which
it is indicated that only personalty
of purely mental (e. g., legal rights,
good will, use of property, etc.),
as distinguished from physical existence is exempted from common
law larceny. The only statement
found which, in defining larceny,
supports the distinction settled upon by the Illinois courts (i e., subdividing personalty into the "tangible" and the "intangible") is that
set out in 25 Cyc. 12 which would
require the property to have

"length, .breadth, and thickness."
The authority there cited do not
support this declaration. The numerous cases holding that heating
gas is subject of theft further belie
its veracity. In United States v.
Carlos, supra, it was said at 560,
"The true test of what is the proper
subject of larceny seems to be not
whether the subject is corporeal
or incorporeal."
But even if it be assumed that
the court is correct in this assertion, still it does not follow that
electricity does not come within the
realm of "tangibility." The only
strict concept which the requirement would seem to evoke is that
of the physicist's "mass." Modern physicists of the greatest note
are now in agreement that there is
no essential distinction between
the classical physicist's twin concepts of mass and energy. Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of
Physics (1938) 208. Thus it is
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arguable that the alleged requirement of "tangibility" is fulfilled
even where the only property involved is pure energy.
A second attempt to bring the
case within the "tangibility" requirement by pointing out that the
free electrons composing the stolen
current have a measureable mass
(9.035 x 10-28 gm., at rest) was essayed by the state. The argument
is easily answered, however, by the
fact that the defendant only intended to appropriate the electrons
temporarily during the interval
wherein they passed through that
part of the circuit which lay on
defendant's property and thence
back to the power company's
transmission lines-a matter of only
a few minutes or hours. (Contrary to the expert witness's testimony the electrons composing conventional electric currents flow
very slowly, although the effects
of their motion travel with speeds
of the same order as that of light.
Morecroft, Principles of Radio
Communication (3d ed., 1933) 12.)
Such teclmological reasoning as the
above is subject to summary dismissal in some jurisdictions on the
ground that laws are written "in
the language of the people, and not
in that of science." Commonwealth
v. Northern Electric Light and
Power Co., 145 Pa. 1105, 118, 22 Atl.
839, 840 (1891).
Since the mere connection of the
"jumper" constitutes of itself merely a trespass, there being no completed crime until asportation is
accomplished by the drawing of
current, there is presented the interesting question as to whether
each interruption of the use of the
illicit electricity would not sever the
entire taking into distinct offenses
each of which would undoubtedly in this case have amounted

merely to petty larceny. However,
in Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78
N. E. 607 (1906), a case of.larceny
of gas, it'was held that the taking
was continuous so long as the
"jumper" pipe was connected tc
the gas company's main regardless,
of whether gas was continuousl3
abstracted, and in the Carlos case,
supra, the same result was reached
even though the "jumper" was detached from time to time.
RICHARD B. HOFFMAN.

ADMISSIBILITY

WIRE TAP,

OF

EVIDENCE

BY

ING.-[Supreme Court of

U. S.] The defendants were tried
and convicted of smuggling alcohol, and of the possession and concealment of smuggled alcohol. Of
major importance in the conviction
was the testimony of federal agents
to the substance of an interstate
telephone conversation of two of
the defencants overheard by means
of tapping their telephone wires.
The trial court permitted the introduction of this evidence over
the defendant's objection. On appeal reversed, two justices dissenting. Held: the evidence obtained
by wire tapping was not admissible
under § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U. S. C. A. Sec.
605. This act which provides that
".. . no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning
of such intercepted communication
to any person . . .," is-sufficiently
broad to prohibit a federal .agent's
communication of the contents of
a telephone message to a court.
The court said that the legislative
history to the effect that congress
did not intend to limit the activities of federal agents was insuffi-
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dence on the basis of the statute
cient to overbear the plain mandate of the statute which states the court was not called upon to
that "no person" shall engage in decide the other issues.
There can be little doubt that
the prohibited practice. Nardone
v. United States 58 Sup. Ct. 275 testimony obtained by wire tapping
(1937).
would be admissible under the
As a general rule unless a stat- rules of evidence. The admissibilute is ambiguous a court will not ity of facts obtained through meinquire into legislative intent. De- chanical devices has been gaining
spite the apparently clear meaning headway in practically all courts.
of the phrase "no person" sufficient Photographs have been admitted to
ambiguity would seem to exist to prove the physical condition of
allow an inquiry into the legislative persons or things at a particular
intent in the instant case. It has time if it can be established that
been held that the word "person" they represent a true picturization.
does not in its ordinary and legal Lawson v. Darter,157 Va. 284, 160
significance embrace either the S. E. 74 (1931); Davis v. Adrian,147
Federal or State government. In Mich. 300, 110 N. W. 1084 (1907);
re Fox (1 73) 52 N. Y. 530. Nor Chicago R. Co. v. Carson, 198 Ill.
is a statute to be construed to apply 98, 64 N. E. 739 (1902). It has
to the United States unless there likewise been held that the eviis an express statement to that dence of an expert as to the ideneffect. Title Guaranty and Surety tity of fingerprints is a proper subCo. v. Guaranty Title and Trust, ject for the consideration of the
174 F. 385 (1909); Dollar Savings jury. People v. Roach, 21' N. Y.
Bank v. United States 86 U. S. 227 592, 109 N. E. 618 (1915); People
v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E.
(1873).
However, it is to be noticed that 1077 (1911); State v. Lapon, 101
Vt. 124, 141 Atl. 686 (1:928). The
§605 does not apply to purely intrastate communications. Valli v. latest development in scientific
United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. methods of proof, is the lie deC. A., 1st, f938); Cf. United States tector. As yet the results based
v. Bonanzi, 94 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. upon this instrument have not been
admitted in evidence to any apA. 2nd, 1938).
However, even if the court had preciable extent. See Frye v.
held that the statute didn't prohibit United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923);
the wire tapping activities of the State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246
This is due
federal agents, in order for the N. W. 314 (1933).
prosecution to assert that the evi- primarily to the fact that the indence obtained by wire tapping was ventor and his associates, feeling
correctly admitted by the lower that it is to the public interest, are
court it would have been necessary making every effort to prevent it
for them"to establish two additional from being generally admitted.
issues. First, that the testimony The records produced by phonowas reliable enough to be admitted graphs, dictaphones, talking moaccording to the rules of evidence. tion picture niachines and other
Second, that the testimony was not similar devices have generally been
obtained by unlawful search and admitted if the identity of the
seizure in violation of the 4th voices or the parties involved can
amendment. By excluding the evi- be established. Commonwealth v.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
On the second
Clark, 123 Pa. Sup. 277, 187 Atl. U. S. 349 (1909).
237 (1936); Kidd v. People, 97 Colo. issue of whether the evidence ob48, 51 Pac. (2d) 1020 (1935); Peo- tained by wire tapping was.in viople v. Schultz, 18 Cal. Ap. (2d) 485, lation of the searches and seizures
64 Pac. (2d) 440 (1937). State v. provision the case of Olmstead v.
Heston, 137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928),
(1926). Contra: State v. Simons, would seem to be controlling. In
174 Atl. 867 (1934). Testimony in that case the court held by 5 to 4
reference to telephone conversa- that telephone conversations were
tions is uniformly admitted if not within the protection of the
proper identification of the parties searches and seizures provisions of
can be established. Where the wit- the 4th amendment. However, it
ness testifying made the call, there is to be noted that the 4 judges
is sufficient identification if its who dissented in the Olmstead deproven that the correct number cision, with new additions, now
was called and that the party re- constituted the majority of the
ceiving the call claimed to be the court in the instant case, and, of
party identified. Thede v. Mat- the original majority in the Olinstead case only two remain, both
thews, 203 Ill. Ap. 507, (1916);
Lord Co. v. Morrill, 178 Mass. 395, of whom dissented in the instant
59 N. E. 807 (1901); Stein v. Jas- case. In view of this change in
cula, 165 Wis. 317, 162 N. W. 182 the court it seems reasonable to
(191'7); Where the witness who is speculate that if the majority had
attempting to identify the parties not been able to exclude the evito a telephone conversation, was dence on the statutory ground they
called it is necessary that the wit- might have reversed the Olmstead
ness be able to identify the voice of case and excluded the evidence on
the party who called. Mankes v. the basis of the searches and seizFishman, 163 App. Div. 789, 149 N. ures provision of the 4th amendY. S. 228 (1914); Tabor Coal Co. ment.
BERNARD H. BEhTRAND.
v. Cohen, 189 Ill. App. 190 (1914);
Cox v. Cline, 147 Iowa 353, 126 N.
W. 330 (1910).
Wire tapping,
FELONY MURDER-INTENT TO COMwhich is merely a telephone conversation testified to by a witness Mrr FELONY AFTER HolvcE.[Penn.]
Defendant struck dewho was not a party to the conversation, would clearly seem to be ceased,
and thereafter, while
admissible if the parties to the deceased (then still living) was
conversation could be identified. lying unconscious upon the ground,
However, in the absence of state- removed a package of tobacco from
ments in the conversation which deceased's pocket and $1.35 in
would identify the parties this re- money from his hand. Death enquirement might present difficul- sued within a few days -as a result
of defendant's blows. The- Comties.
At an early date the Supreme monwealth alleged that the lilling
Court held that evidence obtained was committed in the perpetration
in violation of the searches and of a robbery. Defendant claimed
seizures provisions of the 4th that he had acted in self defense
amendment should not be admisin striking deceased, and that his
sible. Weems v. United States, 217 intention to steal did not originate
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until subsequent to the encounter
and after deceased had fallen unconscious to the ground. The jury
found him guilty of murder in the
first degree and imposed the death
penalty. Judgment and sentence
of conviction. On appeal affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Stelma, 327 Pa.
317, 192 Atl. 906 (1937).
The Supreme Court held that the
prosecution having established by
the verdict that the homicide was
committed in the perpetration .of a
robbery, it was deemed to be murder in the first degree, because of
the statute which provides that,
"All murder . . . which shall be
committed in the perpetration of,
or attempting to perpetrate any
. . .robbery . . .shall be deemed
murder in the first degree." 1B
Purdon's Pa. Stats. §2221. The
court also said the affirmance was
proper on the ground that the jury
found that defendant was engaged
in the perpetration of a robbery
when he struck deceased. However, the court said (327 Pa. 317,
321, 192 Atl. 906, 908), "The defendant's argument that the intention to rob originated subsequent
to the "assault upon the deceased
need not be seriously considered
in view of the verdict of the jury,
moreover, even though such were
the case, it is immaterial when the
design to rob was conceived, if the
homicide occurred while defendant
was perpetrating or attempting to
perpetrate a robbery. It is generally provided by statute that any
homicide committed in the perpetration of, 5r attempt to perpetrate,
either certain named felonies (as in
the Pennsylvania statute), or any
felony in general, or any act of a
felonious nature inherently dangerous to human life, etc., shall be
a murder. Under these statutes,
the malice necessary to constitute

murder is found in the nature of
the act upon which the accused is
engaged, and no specific intent to
kill need be shown. But the killing must occur while the accused
is in the course of perpetrating the
felonious act in question, however,
and that part of the court's statement in the instant case quoted
above to the effect that it is immaterial when the design to rob was
conceived, may be misleading when
not properly qualified.
Where the killing occurs while
the accused is actually engaged in
the felonious act there is no question that the homicide constitutes
murder. Miller, Criminal Law 268.
Where the killing occurs after the
felony has been. completed, there
is a well established, though not
universally followed, body of law
to the effect that so long as the
killing is committed within the res
gestae of the felonious act, it is
homicide in the perpetration of a
felony. Commonwealth v. Ferko,
26.9 Pa. 39, 112 Atl. 38 (1920); CommonweaZth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108,
118 Atl. 24 (1922); Commonwealth
v. Lawrence, 282 Pa. 128, 127 Atl.
465 (1925)A third possible situation, where
the killing occurs before the accused has launched upon the
course of committing a crime subsequently committed or attempted,
is the one in regard to which certain inferences which might be
drawn from the statement of the
court already referred to are questioned. Where there is as yet no
intention to rob, can the accused
be said to be engaged in the perpetration of, or an attempt to
perpetrate robbery? One of the
essential elements of the crime of
robbery at common law, and as
defined in most statutes, is the felonious intent. Until such intention
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can be said to exist, there can be
no robbery or attempt to rob.
Hence it seems impossible for a
killing occurring before the conception of an intent to rob to have
occurred in the perpetration of, or
an attempt to perpetrate a robbery.
The application of the res gestae
notion in this sort of a case seems
impossible, for, unlike the case of
a killing occurring after the commission of a robbery, a killing before there was an intent to rob
cannot be said to be connected
with, or a result of, a general felonious scheme when no suchi
scheme could then exist. A contrary argument might possibly be
made upon the basis of the statute
in Pennsylvania which, after defining robbery much the same as it
was defined at common law (18
Purdon's Pa. Stats. §2892), defines
robbery under aggravating circumstances thus: "If any person . . .
shall rob any person, and . . . immediately before . . . such robbery, beat, strike, or ill-use any
person, or do violence to such person, the person so offending shall
be guilty of felony . . ." (18 Purdon's Pa. Stats. §2892). The argument based upon this statute would
be to the effect that the legislature
has expressly provided that a violent attack upon the victim immediately prior to robbing him
shall be deemed part of the offense,
that is, that the legislature has in
effect expressly enacted that the
res gestae notion shall apply in
such a case, to make the attack
upon the victim prior to the robbery a part of the scheme. It must
be noted, though, that this statute
does nothing to qualify the requirement of intent as an essential
element of the crime, nor does it
contain any expression to the effect
that the violence done to the vic-
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time may be done before the inception of an intent to rob. The
purpose of this statute was to provide for' a greater penalty in the
case of robberies of an aggravated
kind, and it would no doubt attach
the greater penalty to a robbery
conceived for the first time immediately after an attack upon the
victim. But that is not to say that
the statute makes the attack a part
of the robbery in the sense that the
attacker could be said to be engaged in the perpetration of a robbery before he had an intent to
rob. The statute in such a case
merely says that it is a worse crime
to rob a person immediately after
doing violence to that person than
where the robbery is committed
without violence. The court in the
instant case makes no mention of
the robbery statutes, nor does it
refer to any of the cases thereunder. An examination of the cases
under the robbery statute in question shows that the problem has
never been dealt with in Pennsylvania.
The question here dealt with,
whether a killing committed before
an intention to commit a felony
(subsequently
committed)
has
been conceived is felony murder,
is one which, as a practical matter,
the courts meet only upon very
rare occasions. In the first place,
where a man kills another, it is
not often that he then, for the first
time, decides to commit some other
felony. Usually, if he is not already
engaged in the commission of some
other crime, a man who unintentionally or otherwise kills. another
will not under such circurristances
conceive of the commission of some
other crime. In the second place,
where such a state of facts actually
exists, the burden of proving them
may well be insurmountable. A
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jury, where a man has assaulted
another, and later, after the other
is dead or dying, steals from him,
will be most skeptical when the accused pleads that he had no intention to steal until after the attack had been- consumated. The
thought occurring to the mind of
the third party that the assault was
engaged in for the purpose of getting the property later stolen, is a
hard one to rebut under such circumstances.
EUGENE H. DUPEE, JR.

PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY-CONVICTION OF PRINCIPAL BEFORE TRIAL
OF AcCESSORY.-[Mass.] The common law distinguished the crime of
an accessory from that of a principal and this distinction constantly
emerges from its alleged dormant
state to plague legislators who have
attempted to alter the common law.
Even in its embryonic stage the
distinction began to be looked upon as an illegitimate child impeding
the proper administration of justice. A major premise at common
law was that the guilt of the principal was imputable to the accessory before the fact. Therefore,
the conviction of the accessory was
to depend upon the conviction of
the principal as a condition precedent and necessarily had to be of
the same grade of offense. 1 Wharton on Criminal Law 12 eA. §270
Consistently, the acquittal of the
principal acquitted the accessory
per se (1 Bishop Criminal Law 9
ed. §666-7), and without conviction
no judgment could be pronounced
against the accessory. Death, a
pardon, or failure of apprehension
of the principal would serve to defeat the carriage of justice for the
accessory could be tried before the
principal only if he consented. 23
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Jour. of Criminal Law 107, 1042.
The principal and accessory could
be indicted and tried together, but
the jury would be instructed to
pass just on the guilt of the principal and if he was acquitted to
discharge the accessory. If the
principal was guilty they would inquire into the guilt of the accessory. People v. Jordon,244 Ill. 386,
91 N. E. 482 (1910); 10 Neb. L.
Bul. 1270. On the other hand if the
principal were tried first and found
guilty, the conviction of the principal was not binding on the accessory" who had a right to re-try
the principal's guilt. The conviction of the principal was, however,
prima facie evidence of the principal's guilt in the -accessory's trial
and the burden was upon the accessory to overcome this presumption. Contrell v. State, 141 Ga. 98,
80 S. E. 649 (1913); State v. Fiore,
85 N. J. L. 311, 88 Atl. 1039 (1913);
State v. Chittem, 13 N. C. 49
(1828).
Almost universally the" legislators have attempted to make the
offense of an accessory an independent and substantive crime and
as a necessary consequence to allow the accessory to be tried independently of the principal. Typical
statutes passed by legislatures are
the Illinois and Massachusetts statutes which provide, that the accessory can be indicted and convicted,
". .. whether the principal is convicted or amenable to justice, or
not . . ." (Ill. State Bar Stats.,
c. 38, §583) or ". . . whether the
principal felon has or has not been
convicted or is or is not amenable
to justice . . . ." Mass. G. L. (Ter.
ed.) c. 274, §3. Ifi view of the fact
that the statutes have two clauses,
first, whether the principal is convicted or not and, second, whether
amenable to justice or not, the
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legislators obviously intended that
the actual apprehension, conviction
or acquittal of the principal should
have no effect on the accessory's
trial and the accessory should be
convicted if at his trial the state
could prove that there was a guilty
principal and he was an accessory
to that principal. A few courts
have allowed the conviction of the
accessory when the principal has
been acquitted by reasoning that
the jury in the accessory's trial
had found that the principal was
guilty even though the jury in -the
principal trial had acquitted him.
Reed v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky.
126, 100 S. W. 856 (1907); Thomas
v. State, 267 Pac. 1040 (Okla.,
1928); Fleming v. State, 142 Miss.
872, 108 So. 143 (1926). Despite
the fact that this seems to be the
logical result from reading the statutes most courts have been reluctan.t to convict an accessory of a
crime when the principal has been
acquitted. State v. St. Philip, 160
La. 468, 125 So. 457 (1929); People
v. Wyherk, 347 Ill. 28, 178 N. E. 890
(1932); and cases cited by Sears
(1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 845. These
courts undoubtedly have been
moved by the same logic which
was instrumental in developing the
common law, e. g., an accessory
can't exist without a guilty principal. In support of these cases it
has been argued that the legislatures only intended to cover the
situation where the principal is not
amenable to justice and not the
situation where the principal is
acquitted. To rebut this argument it
is -only necessary to point out that
the statutes have two clauses one
of which specifically takes care of
the situation where the principal
is not amenable to justice and the
second, e. g., whether convicted or
not, would seem to cover the situa-
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tion of an acquittal. If the suggested interpretation were adopted
the second clause would become
meaningless.
It is generally believed that the
statutes by attempting to make the
result of the trial of the principal
irrelevant when the accessory is
being tried impose a greater hardship on the accessory because he
is not allowed to take advantage
of a principal's acquittal. It should
not be overlooked, however, that
the modern statutes can aid an accessory when the principal is convicted. At common law when the
principal was convicted, on the accessory's trial the state was aided
by a prima facie case. If the principal's trial is to be irrelevant for
one purpose it should be for another and by following the modern statutes the state should not
be granted the benefit of a prima
facie case after the principal is convicted. A recent Massachusetts
case demonstrated this advantage
to the accused, who notwithstanding this advantage was found guilty.
The principal, in financial straits,
acquired a large number of insurance policies. The defendant who
was the son of the principal was
made beneficiary in all of these
policies. Insured in amounts far
in excess of his resources, the principal aided and abetted by the defendant devised a plan to materialize on the insurance policies. The
principal lured an inebriated man
into his car, drove to a secluded
spot and there beat the victim into
a state of unconsciousness with an
iron bar. As the man lay .prostrate
in the machine, the principal saturated the upholstery with gasoline
and ignited it. The unfortunate
derelict was burned beyond recognition and died as a result of monoxide poisoning. In accordance
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with previous plans, the principal
remained in hiding, waiting for the
payment of his life insurance policies to his son. Both were apprehended and were tried together
as principals. On the trial a. pi incipals a directed verdict was returned in favor of the accessory.
The principal, however, was found
guilty of murder in the first degree.
Commonwealth v. Di Staccio, 1 N.

E. (2d) 191. Subsequently the defendant was found guilty as accessory before the fact to a murder. Nevertheless the accossory
was allowed to retry the principal's
guilt and the burden of proving the
principal's guilt in the accessory's
trial remained on the state. Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 11 N. E.
(2d) 799 (Mass., 1937).
JAsS

V. CuNNmGAM.

